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THE NEW UNITED KINGDOM INDUSTRIAL DESIGN LAW 
Christine Fellnert 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial design law in the United Kingdom has just undergone the 
most fundamental revision of this century. The Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act of 1988 (1988 Act) was introduced in the House of Lords (a typ-
ical practice with a bill of great technical complexity and allegedly little 
political, or at least party political, significance) on October 28, 1987. It 
passed the House of Commons in July 1988, received Royal Assent on 
November IS, 1988, and came into force on August I, 1989. 
The 1988 Act restates the law of copyright, bringing it up to date where 
necessary to accommodate new technologies and changing commercial con-
ditions. It therefore repeals the Copyright Act of 1956 (1956 Act), it 
amends the Registered Designs Act of 1949 (1949 Act), and introduces a 
new "unregistered design right" in an attempt to resolve the dilemma of 
protecting functional designs while avoiding the anticompetitive effects 
which this can cause. Judging by the Parliamentary debates on the bill, the 
1988 Act will give rise to as much ill-natured and self-interested controversy 
as did the previous bizarre system of protecting functional designs by artis-
tic copyright. As stated by the House of Lords in British Leyland Motor Co. 
v. Armstrong Patents Co., I this system developed by accident and was proba-
bly not what Parliament ever intended. Indeed, the Gregory Committee, on 
whose report2 the 1956 Act was based, foresaw the risk of purely functional 
designs becoming protected by copyright as a result of some of the reforms 
they recommended. The Committee therefore attempted to provide against 
this problem. Unfortunately, because courts of the United Kingdom are 
generally not permitted to look at background material to legislation when 
trying to interpret it, they persistently flew in the face of Parliament's prob-
able intention when they developed the system of protection which the 
House of Lords so deplored. 
Since various transitional provisions in the 1988 Act will preserve 
parts of the old system for up to ten years, an analysis of the old law is 
required before considering what changes the new system has made. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE OLD LAW 
A. Aesthetic Designs 
Under the old law, the major division was between "aesthetic" and 
t B.A. (Jurisprudence), 1968, Oxford University; B.C.L. (Bachelor of Civil Law), 1969, 
Oxford University. News Section Editor, European Intellectual Property Review; Barris-
ter, London, England, specializing in intellectual property. Ms. Fellner has been a fun-
time Lecturer in Law at Southampton University and a part-time Lecturer for Queen 
Mary College and City University Business School, London, England. 
1. 1986 F.S.R. 221, 1986 R.P.C. 279. 
2. Report of the Copyright Committee, 1952, CMND., No. 8662. 
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"functional" designs. Experts argue at length about the philosophical, and 
indeed commercial, justification for this division, but such division is well-
established in most industrialized countries. Aesthetic designs are those 
which have features of shape, configuration, pattern, or ornament which 
"appeal to and are judged solely by the eye." For example, in Lamsons 
Application,3 computer printout paper with alternate collections of lines in 
green and orange was denied registration under the Registered Designs Act 
of 1949 because although it had eye appeal in the sense of looking quite 
attractive, the reason for the alternating colors was the functional purpose of 
greater ease of reading. Therefore, the court found that the color pattern 
was not an aesthetic design because it was not being judged "solely" by the 
eye. The eye which judges the design is that of the customer; however, cus-
tomers at all stages of the distribution chain are to be taken into account. 
Thus, in Kevi AIS v. Suspa-Verein U.K. Ltd.,4 the court held that the eyes to 
be appealed to were not only those of the office furniture manufacturers, 
who bought the castors for fitting to their furniture, but also the retailers 
who bought the furniture to offer for sale to their customers, as well as the 
ultimate customers themselves. 
Further, to be aesthetic, a design must not represent a "method or prin-
ciple of construction," s:nce this could lead to a monopoly over such a 
method. The most frequently quoted example is Moody v. Tree, 5 wherein a 
design for a basket in which the weaving of the osiers in single file with all 
the butt-ends to the outside was alleged to have produced a novel pattern. 
This was held invalid because it would protect a method of construction 
which might legitimately be used by others. Other examples concern the 
pattern of bones in old-fashioned corsets. 6 
The third requirement is that the design should not, whether in shape or 
configuration, be "dictated solely" by the function which the article to which 
it is applied has to perform. In the leading case of Amp v. Utilux,7 the House 
of Lords said this happened when the designer took into account in making 
his design only functional considerations, even if he happened to produce 
something which looked nice or whose appearance might appeal to engi-
neers as signifying particular suitability for its purpose. The artefact 
involved was an electrical terminal forming part of the internal workings of 
a washing machine, which the designer freely admitted he had designed 
having regard only to purpose, interlocking, material, and price, but which, 
to his surprise and pleasure, had turned out to have a novel and attractive 
shape. But in Interlego AG v. Tyco Industries Inc., 8 the Privy Council, con-
trary to the view taken in some common law countries, decided that the 
3. 1978 R.P.C. I. 
4. 1982 R.P.C. 173. 
5. [189219 R.P.C. 333. 
6. £.g., Bayer's Design, (1906) 24 R.P'C. 65, (1907) 25 R.P.C. 56. 
7. 1972 R.P.C. 103. 
8. 1988 R.P.C. 343. 
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appearance of Lego bricks was not "dictated solely by" the function of inter-
locking with other bricks, because they were toys and toys must look attrac-
tive. 
The old definition of a registrable design was contained in section 1(3) 
of the Registered Designs Act of 1949. This definition governed not only 
the term of protection for aesthetic designs under copyright, but also the 
extent to which there could be cumulative protection by both registration 
and copyright. Section 1(4) and Designs Rule 26 made thereunder9 also 
excluded from registration certain other aesthetic designs "primarily of a 
literary or artistic character" such as sculpture, medallions, calendars, . 
greeting cards, plans, stamps, share certificates, sewing patterns, and maps, 
~~~re~ro~~~~~oo~~a~~ 
B. Protection By Copyright 
Aesthe~ic designs were protected in two ways. As soon as they came 
into being, they were automatically protected by copyright 10 provided they 
were derived from an "original artistic work." These works were (and, 
with minor alteration of terminology, still are under the new Act) drawings, 
sculptures, paintings, engravings and photographs (all "irrespective of 
artistic quality," so as to avoid the temptation by the judiciary to exercise 
aesthetic judgment), works of architecture, and works of artistic craftsman-
shipll (the latter, exceptionally, require the court to have regard to "artistry," 
on which they listen to both lay and expert evidence and evidence of the 
designer's motivation).12 "Original" had (and still has) the usual copyright 
meaning in common law countries-it required only that the work not be 
actually copied from another work, with no required standard of creative 
achievement or personal stamp. This protection endured for fifteen years 
from first marketing, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 13 
These designs were infringed by "reproduction,"14 which meant copy-
ing. This might be indirect, by copying another copy, through a verbal 
description,15 or by some form of subconscious copying. Subconscious 
copying has been found to have occurred where the defendant's designer has 
been proved to have attended an exhibition at which the plaintiff's product 
was displayed, but swears that he or she has no recollection of having seen 
the product before producing the defendant's design. It may then be held 
that the design must have registered subconsciously and recurred to the 
designer on setting to work. Note that this may of course be merely a polite 
9. Currently The Registered Designs Rules. S.l. 1989, No. 1105. 
10. The United Kingdom. as a Berne Convention country. does not require deposit or mark-
ing as a prerequisite to subsistence or enforcement. 
II. Hensher (George) Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery Ltd., 1975 R.P.C. 31. 
12. Copyright Act, 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 3(1). 
13. Id. § 10(3) as amended by Design Copyright Act 1968. 
14. Id. § 3(5)(a). 
15. Solar Thomson Eng'g Ltd. v. Barton, 1977 R.P.C. 537. 
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way of disbelieving the designer. Reproduction might be of the whole or of 
a substantial part. 16 This included making a three-dimensional copy of a 
two-dimensional work and vice versa. 17 Authorizing another person to 
make a reproduction would also be an infringement. 18 There was also "sec-
ondary infringement" by importing or dealing with what were known to be 
infringing copies. 19 Remedies included the notorious "conversion" dam-
ages,20 whereby the infringer had to hand over to the successful plaintiff 
virtually the whole of the price he received for each infringing copy, not 
merely the loss of profit which the plaintiff had suffered, or a reasonable 
royalty. . 
C. Protection By Design Registration 
Aesthetic designs could also be protected optionally, by registration 
under the 1949 Act for a maximum of fifteen years (three five-year periods) 
from the date of application, provided the design was novel in the United 
Kingdom and originaI,21 which in this context seemed to mean something 
like nonobvious in patent law. This was a monopoly right, infringed by any-
one who produced the same design even by independent creation, and the 
Paris Convention regime applied to it. Registration could only be obtained 
for "the-design-as-applied-to-an-article." This did not affect "shape or 
configuration" designs significantly, except for the mental contortion 
required to envisage, for example, a basic shoe to which all the features of 
the design were then "applied." It could, however, be a disadvantage for 
"pattern or ornament" designs, where it was not possible to register some-
thing like a popular cartoon character so as to prevent anyone else from 
applying it to anything, but only to register it as applied to T-shirts, pencil 
boxes, children's plates, and so on, for each of which a separate registration 
was needed. 
An important point was that copyright and design registration were 
cumulative for aesthetic designs. This was only the case after the Design 
Copyright Act of 1968, which was passed to enable the Birmingham jewelry 
industry to protect its products from copying without having to wait for a 
registered design to be granted, which was usually too late. That Act gave 
copyright to aesthetic (registrable) industrial designs, but limited it to the 
registered design period of fifteen years. 
D. Functional and Other Designs 
All other industrial designs, those which were "primarily literary or 
16. Copyright Act. 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2. ch. 74, § 49(1). 
17. [d. § 48(1). 
18. [d. § 1(2). 
19. [d. § 5(2). 
20. [d. § 18. 
21. Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, ch. 46, § 1(2). 
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artistic" and those which were wholly functional, were protected only by 
copyright, for the full period of the author's life plus fifty years. Thus, 
because they started life as engineering drawings,22 because copying could 
be indirect as well as direct, and .because it could be done by reproducing a 
two-dimensional work (the plaintiff's drawing) in three-dimensional form, a 
host of wholly functional, nonregistrable articles designed without regard to 
appearance achieved the same protection as the modern equivalents of a 
Rembrandt, a Beethoven symphony, or a Shakespeare play. Among the 
worthy articles of commerce thus privileged have been screws, bolts, wash-
ers,23 clerical collars,24 paper-mache bedpans,25 pulley wheels,26 and plas-
tic knock-down drawers.~7 
There were three exceptions. The first was where a design was not 
derived from an "original artistic work" because it started life as a proto-
type in three dimensions which was neither a "sculpture" nor a "work of 
artistic craftsmanship.,,28 The leading case of Hensher v. Restawile29 con-
cerned a suite of ordinary mass-produced furniture which could have been 
registered as a design but was not. There was a prototype consisting of a 
rough wooden frame with upholstery tacked to it, but no "artistic work. ,,30 
The House of Lords accordingly refused to find that this was a "work of 
artistic craftsmanship," and the action failed. Again, in Merlel v. Mother-
care, 3 I a waterproof cape for a baby was cut and stitched as a prototype 
before any pattern was made, and the designer, who was actually a profes-
sional fashion designer, admitted that when she made it she was not setting 
out to make a "work of art." The garment, therefore, could not be a "work 
of artistic craftsmanship," and so was unprotected against copying. 
The second exception was where a three-dimensional allegedly infringing 
copy "would not appear, to persons who are not experts in relation to objects 
of that description, to be a reproduction" of a two-dimensional drawing. 
This was known as the "section 9(8) defense," or "lay recognition" test, and 
was a more or less faithful reflection of a recommendation by the Gregory 
Committee32 designed to prevent functional objects from getting copyright 
22. "Artistic works" "irrespective of artistic quality." Copyright Act, 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, 
ch. 74, §§ 3(1).48(1). 
23. British Northrop Ltd. v. Texteam D1ackburn Ltd., 1974 R.P.C. 57. 
24. Gleeson v. H. R. Denne Ltd., 1975 R.P.C. 471. 
25. Vernon (Pulp Products) v. Universal Pulp Containers, 1980 F.S.R. 179. 
26. Solar Thomson Eng'g Ltd. v. Barton, 1977 R.P.C. 537. 
27. L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Prods. Ltd., 1979 R.P.C. 55 I. 
28. It should be remembered that sculpture is protected "irrespective of artistic quality:' 
For example, in WHAM-O Mfg. Co. v. Lincoln Indus., 1985 R.P.C. 127, the original 
wooden model of a "frisbee" Hying disc was held to be a "sculpture:' under the New 
Zealand Copyright Act, which was similar to the United Kingdom 1956 Act. 
29. 1975 R.P.C. 31. 
30. In fact, there were some sketches, but these failed the Copyright Act § 9(8) "lay recogni-
tion" test. 
31. 1986 R.P.C. 115. 
32. See supra note 2. 
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protection based on drawings. The idea was that while anyone would recog-
nize that a Popeye brooch was a three-dimensional reproduction of the car-
toon character, owing most of its appeal to the artistic skiII which went into 
the drawing, the average person unused. to reading blueprints would not 
readily recognize the vacuum cleaner component held in their hand as the 
thing depicted in the drawing, which in any event functioned only as an 
instruction to the manufacturer and had no artistic value of its own. But the 
subsection lacked effect, as its woolliness perhaps deserved, since the 
Gregory Report itself was never referred to. Judges declined to entertain 
parades of nonexperts called by each side to swear to their entire ignorance 
of the subject matter in question and the consummate ease or total bewilder-
ment with which they compared the object and the drawing. Judges consti-
tuted themselves lay recognizers being, after several days of a trial, fully 
familiarized with the articles in suit. 33 Almost without exception,34 they 
were duly recogni~ed. 
Perhaps the most notable exception which survives the passing of the 
1988 Act is what Lord Scarman tactfully described as "the principle latent 
in our law but not fully discussed or expressed until the present case"-the 
"spare parts exception" disclosed in British Leyland Motor Co. v. Armstrong 
Patents Co. 35 Where an article based on a copyright work (such as an 
exhaust pipe made from a drawing) forms part of a larger article (such as an 
automobile) with a longer life expectancy than the part, so that the part will 
have to be renewed or replaced several times during the life of the work, it 
would be a "derogation from the grant" of the automobile to use the retained 
copyright in the exhaust pipe drawing to prevent other manufacturers from 
making replacement exhausts and thereby aJlowing the automobile owner to 
have his vehicle repaired as cheaply and conveniently as possible without 
having to go back to the original equipment (OE) manufacturer for spares 
and pay whatever price he chooses to demand. As Lord Templeman put it, 
without the spare parts exception which he invented, "[T]he purchaser of a 
BL car sells his soul to the company store." It was also said that the OE 
manufacturer "exhausts his copyright" by first sale of the vehicle with the 
exhaust pipe fitted to it, and that outside component manufacturers do the 
same with the parts they make. The spare parts exception cannot be 
excluded by contract, although it does not apply where a part is covered by a 
patent or registered design. Such parts, however, might be caught by the 
"implied license" which permits the owner of a patented or design-registered 
or copyright-protected article to have it repaired by someone other than the 
original manufacturer. 36 
This decision was one of policy, which trawled for the legal garments to 
33. The defense was a last-ditch effort. the test never being made until copying had been 
found to have occurred. 
34. The main exception was the late Judge Walton. 
35. 1986 ES.R. 221; 1986 R.P.C. 279. 
36. Solar Thomson Eng'g Ltd. v. Barton. 1977 R.P.C. 537. 
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cover its nakedness in the murky waters of real property and European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) law. Many questions, unfortunately, have been left 
unanswered. It is clear that the exception applies to mass-produced multi-
component articles which regularly need parts replaced, and thus' covers 
household appliances, most vehicles, and machinery such as agricultural 
equipment. But does it apply to atomic power-station machinery and high-
technology aircraft which are very expensive to develop and of which rela-
tively few are made? Does it apply where quality control is crucial, and can-
not be ensured by simply reverse engineering? What happens if a govern-
ment department wants parts of its carpets replaced because they have worn 
out, and finds a manufacturer who can do this more cheaply than the original 
supplier? Perhaps most important, does the exception apply only where the 
competing spares manufacturer must copy in order to make a part which will 
fit and do the job it is intended to do, so that the original equipment manufactur-
er's copyright would otherwise give him a monopoly on the spares? Or could it 
also cover any spares where it is economically desirable for the competing man-
ufacturer (and hence probably for the consumer) to copy rather than develop his 
own alternative? There are also concerns over parts which have to be a copy at 
one end in order to fit an existing machine, but could otherwise be different, like 
add-on ploughing and harrowing devices for tractors. 
III. NEED FOR REFORM 
In the British Leyland case, the House of Lords was dealing with a 
design which had to be copied in order to work-the shape of the exhaust 
pipe itself, which was governed by the track left for it around the other com-
ponents on the underside of the vehicle. Their Lordships were therefore try-
ing to put right the anticompetitive results which followed from the unfore-
seen and unintended development of copyright to give owners a monopoly 
on designs which were not patentable because they were not inventive and 
would not have been entitled to design registration, not only because they 
were functional rather than aesthetic, but often because they were neither 
novel nor original. Moreover, the application of copyright meant that these 
designs were being protected, not just for the normal fifteen- or twenty-year 
term which is usual for monopoly industrial property rights, nor even for the 
compromise fifteen-year term given for copyright in aesthetic designs, but 
for the full copyright term of the author's life plus fifty years. 
A similar problem with the stifling of competition was also found to 
exist with aesthetic designs in certain circumstances. For example, with 
respect to the replacement of car body panels, the Office of Fair Trading37 
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission38 found that the Ford Motor 
37. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, FORD MOTOR CO. LTD.-LICENSING FOR THE MANUFACTURE 
AND SALE OF REPLACEMENT BODY PARTS, A REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION UNDER SEC-
TION 3 OF THE COMPETlTlON ACT OF 1980 (Mar. 21, 1984). 
38. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING COMMITTEE, CMND., No. 9437. 
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Company was refusing to license other manufacturers to make replacements 
and was charging inflated prices for its own spares. This practice was casti-
gated from the consumer's poiQt of view, but under copyright law as it stood 
before British Leyland, the Monopolies and Mergers. Commission felt noth-
ing could be done about it. It should be stressed that in both these cases the 
competitors were not "pirates" in the sense of counterfeiters passing off 
inferior and sometimes dangerous products on an unsuspecting market, but 
highly respectable manufacturers, often original equipment makers them-
selves, who were perfectly open about what they were doing. Indeed, the 
complaining manufacturers themselves often operated their own parts divi-
sions through which they provided unlicensed spares for their competitors' 
vehicles. This led to a good deal of schizophrenia within the industry and 
its trade association, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. 
After a couple of false starts in Green Papers,39 the government took 
the opportunity of the reform of copyright law to try to take care of these 
problematic designs by means of a specially-tailored right which would give 
some protection to design effort and investment while guarding against 
anticompetitive abuses. Its views were laid out in a 1986 White Paper,40 in 
which it firmly rejected a statutory "unfair copying" provision, on the lines 
of the statute- or code-based unfair competition jurisdictions of many Euro-
pean countries, which might have provided a reasonably workable means of 
protecting even "deserving" functional designs while preserving freedom of 
competition where desirable. Instead, in the interests of "certainty" for 
industry, it opted for a threefold system which it has now attempted to 
enact. Copyright is retained for "genuinely" artistic designs; design regis-
tration for aesthetic designs is strengthened but restricted in scope by the 
introduction of some competition-enhancing devices; and a new "unregis-
tered design right," which is a hybrid of both, is provided for functional 
designs and, as an alternative or supplement to registered protection, for 
aesthetic designs as well. 
The government provided to interested parties a series of "Notes on 
Clauses" indicating what it thought it was doing in each clause of the bill. 
Further light (or obscurity) was cast by the utterances of diligent but 
sometimes confused government spokesmen during these Parliamentary 
debates, duly reported in Hansard, together with the persistent and often ill-
informed c1amorings of those briefed by particular pressure groups. These 
expressions of intent are referred to in what follows as a matter of interest, 
thereby allowing the readers of this Article to be in a better position than 
Her Majesty's judges, who will never be allowed to look at them in the 
39. Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection, 1981, 
CMND., No. 8302 (proposal to deny copyright as well as design registration to designs 
whose appearance is "dictated by function"); Intellectual Property Rights and Innova-
tion, 1983, CMND., No. 9117 (withdraw copyright from "functional articles manufac-
tured in quantity·' but extend design registration to novel functional designs). 
40. Intellectual ProperlY and Innovation, 1986, CMND., No. 9712. 
1989] The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law 377 
course of their duty since Hansard may never be referred to in arguing or 
deciding a case, however ambiguous the statute under interpretation may be. 
IV. UNREGISTERED DESIGN RIGHT 
A. What It Covers 
The new right is defined by section 213 as "a property right which sub-
sists ... in an original design." "Design" means "the design of any aspect 
of the shape or configuration (whether internal or external) of the whole or 
any part of an article." It is important to note that, subject to certain exclu-
sions dealt with below, no distinction is drawn or intended between aesthetic 
and functional designs; both are intended to be covered. All that is neces-
sary is that the design be applied to an "article." The Notes on Clauses sug-
gest that the designer's intention is somehow material. However, there 
seems no warrant for this gloss in the actual wording, unless it can be 
argued that "design" is a purposive word and the statute deliberately speaks 
of an article's "design" rather than simply its "appearance." Under the 
Copyright Act of 1911 (1911 Act), which prohibited cumulative protection 
by both copyright and design registration, the test applied was both whether 
the design was registrable and whether it was intended to be industrially 
exploited at the time it was first made. 41 If it was only industrially exploited 
as an afterthought, then copyright protection was not lost. The 1956 Act, 
which before its amendment by the Design Copyright Act of 1968 also pre-
vented cumulative protection, abandoned this system and made either 
actual registration or industrial exploitation of a registrable design, when-
ever occurring, the trigger for loss of copyright.42 Perhaps the new 
definition is an attempt to reintroduce the 1911 test through the back door. 
It certainly is consistent with the government's own understanding of what it 
has achieved by sections 51 and 52. 
There are several exclusions from design right. The first, whose 
significance has yet to be determined, is that only "original" designs qual-
ify. "Original" is defined as "not commonplace in the design field in ques-
tion at the time of its creation." A government spokesman indicated that 
design right was not meant to be given to "mundane routine designs" in 
"common currency." He suggested, as an example of something "original" 
attached to something "commonplace," the fins which are beginning to 
appear on the tips of aircraft wings. No doubt the designers of aircraft 
wings would take a different view on whether their basic wing designs are 
mundane, routine, and commonplace. The Notes on Clauses said that 
"original" was to be understood in the copyright sense of "not [being] ... a 
copy. but not necessarily noveJ." What the 1988 Act's definition means in 
41. Copyright Act. 1911. I & 2 Geo. 5. ch. 46. § 22; see also King Features Syndicate v. 0. 
& M. Kleeman. (1941) 58 R.P'C. 207. 
42. Copyright Act. 1911. 1& 2 Geo. 5. ch. 46. § 10. 
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practice will depend on whether the courts continue to apply a low copyright 
standard of originality43 or whether they evolve some different standard. 
They might choose to consider the registered design "nonobvious" original-
ity test, or perhaps even something like the registered design novelty test, 
which inquires whether the proposed design differs from an existing one 
only in immaterial details or in features which are common trade variants. 
The White Paper in paragraph 3.21, incidentally, spoke of protecting 
designs on which money had been spent. This criterion, however, has not 
been enacted as a test, although it will apparently be taken into account in 
fixing a royalty under the licenses-of-right which will be a feature of the new 
system. 
Further exclusions which are undoubtedly of major importance are 
contained in section 213(3), which provides, in pertinent part, that design 
right does not subsist in the following: 
(a) a method or principle of construction 
(b) features of shape or configuration of an article which 
(i) enable the article to be connected to, or placed in, around 
or against, another article so that either article may perform 
its function [known as the "must-fit" exception], or 
(ii) are dependent upon the appearance of another article of 
which the article is intended by the designer to form an inte-
gral part [known as the "must-match" exception], or 
(c) surface decoration. 
Exception (a) obviously derives from the same expression used in the Regis-
tered Designs Act of 1949, and presumably will be treated in the same way. 
The exceptions in (b) have caused a significant amount of controversy, and 
go much farther than the government indicated in the White Paper. 
"Must-fit" is effectively a statutory enactment of the British Leyland 
decision. It will allow spare parts to be copied so as to fit into, onto, or 
around an existing piece of machinery. It seems, and means according to 
the government, to allow copying only of the interfaces, not of the rest of a 
part, which will, if original and not otherwise excluded, have design right. 
Nevertheless, the spokesman indicated that there was to be no design right 
for the interfaces even if they do not have to be the same in order to fit. 
Whether this is really so seems to depend on the meaning of the word 
"enable" in exception (b)(i), which does seem benign enough to suggest that 
even if there is more than one way in whic~ one article can be made to fit 
into another, the competitor is under no obligation to choose a different one 
from the originator. This provision naturally caused an outcry among OE 
manufacturers who, it must be observed, existed without functional design 
protection until the mid-1960s when they suddenly realized what miracles 
43. Recently somewhat qualified as to these wilder excesses by Interlego AG v. Tyco Indus. 
Inc .• 1988 R.P.C. 343. 
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the 1956 Act could do for them.44 It was pointed out that functional 
copyright has been a valuable weapon against counterfeiters who put dan-
gerous parts on the market. The government's answer, however, was that 
trademark and consumer protection laws are available to deal with those 
problems. It was also urged that rather than exclude design right altogether, 
the government should take steps to exclude certain categories of products 
only if it was shown to be necessary to safeguard free competition. This too 
was refused. It should be observed that the "must-fit" exception will also 
cover what would normally be regarded as "accessories" rather than "spare 
parts," like printer and typewriter consumables. 
The "must-match" exception is aimed primarily (in politics if not in law) 
at car body panels, so that Ford cannot hold motorists and their insurance 
companies for ransom in repairing accident damage. The government says it 
is not meant to apply to commonplace, mundane, routine, independently-de-
signed freestanding struts which someone else subsequently copies many 
times over to make a grill, arguing that each bar of the grill "must match" the 
others. In other words, the thing must originally be designed as part of some-
thing else to the overall appearance of which it owes its own shape. Concern 
was expressed by the china and pottery industry, since for example, replace-
ment lids for teapots and soup tureens certainly owe features of their shape to 
the appearance of the teapot or soup tureen as a whole. The government 
made soothing noises, apparently on the basis that the need for the article 
which "must match" to form an "integral" part of another article would 
exclude things like teapots which belong in two parts and are not permanently 
fixed together. It is not clear that this is the correct view. The "must-match" 
exception has been criticized, even more passionately than the "must-fit" 
exception, as being the result of a government obsession with the motor indus-
try and its particular problems. It will undoubtedly encompass numerous 
other types of outer casing, for example computers. 
Unlike registered designs, which can be for pattern and ornament as 
well as shape and configuration, design right expressly excludes "surface 
decoration," for which copyright is still the primary method of protection. 
The basic principles of artistic copyright and its infringement are retained 
largely unaltered in the 1988 Act, but exclude most of the field of industrial 
designs, with certain exceptions. If such decoration is two-dimensional, it 
will no doubt qualify as a "graphic work" (a new expression in the 1988 Act, 
apparently replacing drawings, paintings, and engravings).45 If it is three-
dimensional it will probably qualify as a sculpture, or it may be a three-di-
mensional reproduction of a graphic work. If, however, the decoration is 
partly pai?ted and partly wire filigree work designed without drawing, 
44. For technical reasons. the 1911 Act would not have worked in the same way because it 
classified engineering drawings as literary rather than artistic works, and one could not 
reproduce a literary work in three dimensions. 
45. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. ch. 48. § 4. 
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unless the filigree is a work of artistic craftsmanship (with the attendant dif-
ficulties of proof),46 its only protection will be by design registration. 
Three different rights in one article! And the copyright may belong to a dif-
ferent person, because if the designer is freelance then the copyright will 
belong to him in the absence of assignment, while the design registration and 
the unregistered design right will belong to the person who commissioned 
him. Another point about the exclusion from unregistered design right of 
"surface decoration" is that printed matter which is technically of an "artis-
tic" character in that it uses lines and shapes rather than words and figures, 
but is of a purely commercial nature, will still have full copyright for fifty 
years after the author's death. Computer stationery used with particular 
accounting packages springs to mind. It is not entirely self-evident that 
these basic commodity items should have such a long period of protection. 
B. How the Right Arises 
With one exception, relating to first marketing. design right only comes 
into being once the design has been recorded in a "design document" or an 
article has been made to the design. A design document is "any record of a 
design, whether in the form of a drawing, a written description, a photo-
graph, data stored in a computer or otherwise." 47 This is the equivalent of 
the copyright requirement that a work be "reduced to a material form" or 
"fixed." The specific mention of data stored in a computer lays to rest any 
question of whether a design is adequately "fixed" if no hard copy has yet 
been made. The point at which fixation takes place will be a matter of evi-
dence. 
What is particularly interesting about the definition of a "design docu-
ment" is the inclusion of a written description, because this appears to intro-
duce the concept of reproducing a literary work in three-dimensional form 
by following the instructions contained in it. There have been several copy-
right cases where a drawing has been held indirectly reproduced through the 
medium of a written or oral description.48 In each of those cases, however, 
there was an "artistic work" in the form of a drawing which could be repro-
duced. The normal rule was exemplified in Brigid Foley Ltd. v. Ellott,49 
where the plaintiff was a knitwear designer and the defendant was reproduc-
ing her work on a commercial scale by following the pattern instructions. 
But these instructions were in the standard "k I P I wfdk2togslk 1 pssok5" 
form and there was no illustration. Accordingly, there was only a literary 
46. See supra notes 10, 28. 
47. Copyright. Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 51,236. 
48. Solar Thomson Eng'g LId. v. Barton, 1977 R.P.C. 537; see also Plix Prods. v. Frank M. 
Winstone (Merchanls), 1986 F.S.R. 608 (copying found in New Zealand where plaintiff's 
design for kiwi fruit packing trays was translated into an industry standard written 
specification. and defendant's designer had followed this without ever seeing plaintiff's 
product, let alone its drawings). 
49. 1982 R.P.C. 433. 
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work and this could not be infringed by reproducing it in three dimensions. 
The same reasoning is applied to arguments that one can infringe the 
copyright in a recipe by making the cake (subject to any implied license to 
do so on a noncommercial scale). With the new definition, however, 
infringement will occur by making the article described in a written design 
document even though there is no artistic work involved. 
The creation of a design right by virtue of making a prototype will 
have the sensible and welcome result of giving protection to designs like 
those in Hensher v. Restawile50 and Merlet v. Mothercare. 51 In these cases, 
the furniture and the baby's cape, respectively, started life as nonartistic 
prototypes. An interesting question arises with textile designs where the 
pattern is woven into the fabric, as in the Jacquard process, since the proto-
type piece of fabric is made without any drawings. If the pattern is treated 
as "surface decoration," then it will be excluded from design right, even 
though the piece of fabric is a three-dimensional model. Under these cir-
cumstances, the designer will be thrown back into copyright with the need 
to show that the prototype piece is a work of artistic craftsmanship. 
Being unregistered, design right comes into being automatically, like 
copyright, since there are no deposit requirements and there is no central, 
searchable record of such designs. Nor is there to be any requirement for 
marking. Although the right is not registrable, and is only to be infringed 
by copying, it has some built-in monopoly safeguards like a provision 
restraining unwarranted threats of infringement proceedings. Under sec-
tion 253, one must not threaten anyone other than a manufacturer or 
importer with proceedings for infringement of a design right unless one is 
prepared to put one's subsistence, ownership, and validity where one's mouth 
is, because a person aggrieved by such threats (which, according to cases 
decided under the similar provisions relating to patents, can include general 
threats made in circulars), can sue for a declaration that. the threats are 
unjustifiable and for an injunction, as well as damages. It is then for the 
person who has made threats to prove infringement, the idea being to dis-
courage the often effective campaigns to frighten off customers by aggres-
sive allegations without troubling to test the right in court. Another 
"monopoly" safeguard is the existence of Crown user provisions covering 
defense (including United Nations and treaty obligations) and hea It.h ser-
vices. There are also the important Iicense-of-right arrangements consid-
ered in more detail below. 
C. Who Gets It and Who Owns It 
Because design right is (whether rightly or wrongly) not regarded as 
either a Berne or a Paris Convention right subject to "national treatment," it 
will not be available to just anyone. One has to be a bit special. As with the 
50. 1975 R.P.C. 31. 
51. 1986 R.P.C. 115. 
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United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, the right will be available 
to foreign-originated52 designs and designers only on a reciprocal basis. 
The designer is normally the first owner of the right, but if he or she creates 
it pursuant to a commission or in the course of his or her employment, then 
the commissioner or employer will be considered the original owner. 53 In 
the case of computer-generated designs, the designer is considered to be 
"the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the 
design are undertaken." 
There is a similar formula in the 1956 Act54 for allocating copyright in 
a motion picture to the producer. Having decided who is prima facie enti-
tled to a design right for any particular design, it is then necessary to see 
whether this is a "qualifying person," who may be either an individual or a 
corporation. A qualifying person is a citizen or subject of, or habitually 
resides in either . . 




any other EEC member state, or 
the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or any United Kingdom colony 
if the Act has been duly extended to these territories, or 
a country designated as enjoying reciprocal protection by virtue of 
extending "adequate" protection for British designs. 
A corporation must be formed under the law of, or have a place of business 
at which substantial business activity in goods actually present in the coun-
try is carried on in, one of the above areas in order to be a "qualifying per-
son.,,55 The term "adequate" is not defined, so the government retains a 
wide discretion to exclude foreign designs if the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry does not fancy what is on offer for British designs in the coun-
try of origin. 
There is one other way in which a design right may arise, and that is by 
first marketing under section 220. If the design is a foreign one which does 
not qualify for protection under sections 217 to 219 because there is no qual-
ifying person, the person who first markets the articles made to the design in 
the United Kingdom56 becomes entitled to design right for it under section 
215 if he is a qualifying person and is exclusively authorized57 to put such 
articles on the market in the United Kingdom. "First" marketing seems to 
mean first marketing anywhere. The effect would seem to be that if a Japa-
nese designer (Japan not having been designated a reciprocal country) exclu-
sively lic~nses a United Kingdom company to be the first distributor of his 
52. "Foreign-originated" in this context means designs and designers other than those from EEC. 
53. Copyright.DesignsandPatemsAct.1988.ch.48.§ 215. 
54. Copyright Act. 1956.4 & 5 Eliz. 2. ch. 74. § 13( 10). 
55. Copyright,DesignsandPatentsAct.1988,ch.48,§§ 217-219,255.256. 
56. Or an EEC member state, Channel Islands. Isle of Man. or United Kingdom colony. but 
not a reciprocal country. 
57. By the person who would be the design right owner ifhe were qualified. 
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product, and that company first markets it in, for example, either the United 
Kingdom or France, the company will get design right and, presumably, 
will be able to use it to keep out the designer's own products when he begins 
to market them. This would be separate and distinct from the distributor's 
action for breach of the contract of exclusivity. The exclusive authorization 
must be "capable of being enforced by legal proceedings in the UK," a 
caveat adopted to take into account the fact that EEC competition law 
(directly applicable in the United Kingdom) will not permit exclusivity to be 
enforced if its effects would be anticompetitive or interfere with the free 
movement of goods between member states. For example, a United King-
dom exclusive licensee cannot keep out parallel imports where the goods 
have been marketed in France by the French exclusive licensee, and vice 
versa. The exact scope of operation of the caveat in section 220 is not 
immediately apparent at the time of this writing. 
D. Duration and Licensing 
Design rights last for fifteen years from the end of the calendar year in 
which the design was first recorded in a design document or a prototype was 
made. The design right normally lasts for ten years from the end of the cal-
endar year in which the first sale or hire occurred. However, where articles 
have been made available, prior to an actual sale or hire, then an additional 
grace period of five years will be granted from the end of that year. 58 The 
idea is that the designer gets ten years from first marketing of the article 
itself, but if the design is for something like an aircraft which is often sold 
off the drawing board before one has actually been made, one gets an extra 
five years to bring it to a sal~able state. 
During the last five years of the term, lice.nses-of-right (compulsory 
licenses without the need to prove nonexploitation or nonsatisfaction of the 
market) are available to anyone who demands one, subject to the terms 
being settled by the Designs Registry if they cannot be agreed upon. 59 The 
earliest date. on which an application to the Designs Registry. can be made is 
one year before licensing must begin.60 The factors to be taken into account 
are apparently to be prescribed by regulations, and are likely to include at 
least the licensor's development costs. The factors to be specified may allow 
a little de facto unfair competition jurisdiction to be established, taking into 
account the originality of the design, ease of copying, value to the licensee 
of the right granted, loss of the licensor's exclusivity if it is a high-fashion 
design, and ease of acquiring valuable know-how once reverse engineering 
is established. In the alternative, the regulation may take a totally different 
approach. The whole question of know-how and show-how will need to be 
considered, as the licensee's ability to provide genuine competition (which is 
58. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch.48, § 216. 
59. Id. §§ 237,246-250. 
60. Id. § 247. 
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supposed to be the reason for imposing licenses-of-right) may depend on 
whether the licensee can insist on getting associated know-how. Safety may 
also be a consideration with some products. It is notable that under section 
254 a licensee of right may not, without the licensor's consent, be described 
on the goods or in advertisements as a licensee of the design right owner. 
These matters are obviously important both politically and commer-
cially, and it is hoped that the government will provide a lead by indicating 
what it wants done. The trouble with the device of Iicenses-of-right is that in 
their long-standing patent law application they were essentially voluntary, in 
that a patentee could reduce the cost of renewal fees by inviting applications, 
but was not bound to do so. "Compulsory" Iicenses-of-right were introduced 
in the Patents Act of 1977, when the patent term was extended, even in rela-
tion to some existing patents, from sixteen to twenty years. During that extra 
four years, to which they would not otherwise have been entitled, these patent-
ees had to submit to licenses-of-right which proved a most fruitful source of 
litigation before both United Kingdom and EEC courts. There is no denying 
that courts ofthe United Kingdom seem to regard these patentees with consid-
erable sympathy when settling terms, overlooking the fact that but for the 
four-year extension the patents would by now have expired. Indeed, the phar-
maceutical industry has been so effective in its lobbying effort that the 1988 
Act abolished licenses-of-right for pharmaceutical patents. 61 If the govern-
ment genuinely wants design licenses-of-right to enhance competition, it had 
better explicitly tell the Designs Registrar and the courts. 
T.here is one further safeguard for the maintaining of competition-
where an inquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission finds that, 
during the first five years the goods are on the market, the design right 
owner has refused to grant voluntary licences on reasonable terms or has 
attempted to impose unduly restrictive conditions, and that this refusal or 
attempt is likely to be against the public interest. Under such circumstan-
ces, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry may cancel or modify the 
offending conditions and/or provide that licenses-of-right are to become 
available immediately.62 This looks very nice on paper, but how readily the 
Secretary of State will make a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, what attitude they will adopt, and how long the whole proce-
dure will take, remains to be seen. 
Voluntary licenses and assignments of design right are governed by sec-
tions 222 to 225. Assignments must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the 
assignor. Licenses, on the other hand, need not be in writing unless they are 
exclusive. Exclusive licensees have concurrent rights of action for infringement, 
subject to the apportionment provisions under sections 234 and 235. 
61. Id. §§ 293-294. 
62. {d. § 238. 
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E. Infringement and Remedies 
Under section 226, the design right owner has the exclusive right "to 
reproduce the design for commercial purposes by making articles to that 
design or by making a design document recording the design for the 
purpose of enabling such articles to be made." "Reproduction" of an article 
has been further defined to mean copying the design "so as to produce arti-
cles exactly or substantially to that design." Reproduction may be direct or 
indirect, and it is immaterial whether any intervening acts themselves 
infringe the design right. Presumably this is meant to cover a case where 
someone merely orally describes a design (not an infringing act), but from 
that description an infringing article can be made. Primary infringement 
occurs where an unauthorized person does or authorizes another to do some-
thing within the design owner's exclusive right. 63 Secondary infringement, 
however, occurs where an unauthorized person imports, has possession for 
commercial purposes, or deals in the course of business with, an article 
which is, and which the person knows or has reason to believe is, an infring-
ing article. 64 Moreover, section 260 proscribes any infringing act in relation 
to a kit of parts for making an infringing article. 
There are one or two refinements in the section 228 definition of an 
"infringing article." An imported article infringes if its making in the 
United Kingdom would have infringed or would have been a breach of an 
exclusive license (except insofar as EEC law otherwise provides). This 
means that parallel imports even of the design owner's own legitimate goods 
will be infringing copies where there is an exclusive license in force. 65 One 
may brandish an exclusive license where the goods come from abroad 
except where they come from an EEC member state and have been marketed 
there by the design right owner or with the owner's consent. Where an arti-
cle is made to a design in which a design right subsists or has subsisted at 
any time, section 228 provides a rebuttable presumption that the article was 
made during the time the right subsisted. Finally, an "infringing article" 
does not include a design document, even though its making may have 
infringed design right. 
There is the usual range of remedies set out in sections 229 to 232. 
Examples of such remedies are: injunctions (interlocutory injunctions, 
Anton Pi lIer search and seize orders, and Mareva asset-freezing orders will 
be granted where appropriate); damages (including "additional" damages 
where the defendant has behaved particularly heinously); account of profits; 
and delivery up of infringing articles or anything specifically adapted for 
making them which the infringer knows or has reason to believe has been or 
will be used to make them. Delivery up can be sought as an interim as well 
63. Id. § 226. 
64. Id. § 227. 
65. Section 228 statutorily overrules CBS United Kingdom LId. v. Charmdale Record 
Distribs., Ltd., 1980F.S.R. 289. . 
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as a final measure, but at the end of the day the court must decide whether 
or not to make an order for forfeiture, destruction, or defacement and must 
in every case consider whether financial compensation or an injunction will 
provide adequate security for the plaintiff. If they will, the court may 
decline to make an order for delivery up and the defendant will get the 
goods back. One novel provision is that applications for delivery up may not 
be made if more than six years have elapsed since the infringing articles 
were made, and order for delivery up may not be made after this date unless 
accompanied by an application for a final disposal order. 
Innocence of the existence of a design right is only a defense to dam-
ages. But in the case of secondary infringement (importing, possessing, 
dealing), where the infringer proves that he or his predecessor in title 
acquired the infringing article unaware of such infringement, the only rem-
edy is damages not to exceed a reasonable royalty. Injunctions are not avail-
able. This is a new idea in intellectual property, and it will be interesting to 
see whether applications for interlocutory injunctions can successfully be 
fought off where the defendant says he is going to prove innocent acquisi-
tion. 
Section 246 gives the Designs Registrar (who is the Comptroller of Pat-
ents) jurisdiction to deal with disputes as to the subsistence or term of a 
design right or the identity of the first owner. The Registrar's decision is 
binding, and no court may decide any such matter except on a reference or 
appeal from the Registrar, in an infringement action or other proceeding 
where the issue arises incidentally, or in a proceeding brought with the 
agreement of the parties or leave from the Comptroller. 
F. Important Considerations 
Although it will be possible to have both an automatic design right and 
a design registration for the same article, design right and copyright protec-
tion are not intended to be cumulative. Where a copyright and a design 
right coexist (as in relation to a design document), if one infringes copyright 
one cannot also infringe design right;66 and one does not infringe copyright 
in a design document or model "recording or embodying a design for any-
thing other than an artistic work" by making the article depicted in the 
design, or by copying an article so made. This cleavage between copyright 
and design right is the jewel in the government's crown and it is dealt with 
under section 51. Thus, if a design document is a drawing of a piston, one 
will infringe design right but not copyright by making the piston, and one 
will infringe copyright but not design right by photocopying the drawing. 
One can of course sue for both, but the same act cannot be an infringement 
of both a copyright and a design right. However, if the design document is a 
preliminary sketch for an ornamental sculpture (that is, artistic work in 
66. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. 1988. ch. 48. § 236. 
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which a design right does not subsist), one will infringe the copyright both 
by photocopying the drawing and by making the sculpture. 67 
Arguments have already arisen among lawyers as to whether section 
51 is apt to achieve the result claimed for it. Sculptures and works of artis-
tic craftsmanship are still "artistic works" under section 4 of the new Act, 
the former "irrespective of artistic quality." New designs for automobile 
bodies, for example, are often made with the aid of clay or wooden models 
rather than drawings, and it is probable that these would be classified as 
"sculptures.,,68 Could it therefore be argued that such a model "embodies a 
design for" an artistic work, or that a sketch of it would "record" a design 
for an artistic work-the artistic work being the sculpture itself, regardless 
of what it was a representation of-in this case a motor vehicle? In the 
Notes on Clauses, the government cites this very example as one where the 
design would clearly be "for" an automobile, not for a sculpture of one, and 
would therefore be a matter for design right rather than copyright, unless 
someone copied the model itself as such, perhaps with a view to exhibiting it 
in his or her garden, or mass-produced it to sell to other people to exhibit in 
theirs. This sounds very reasonable, and if the section is given a common 
sense application, in nine cases out of ten it will be quite obvious that the 
design, even though itself technically an artistic work, is really "for" some-
thing else. However, "for" is another of those purposive words; what it 
means is "intended for," and the Notes on Clauses say as much. Are we to 
go back to looking at the designer's intention as under the 1911 Act? 
This discussion will have for American lawyers queasy undertones of 
costume jewelry and Balinese dancers, problems from which, up to now, 
lawyers in the United Kingdom have been free. Hitherto, "functional" for 
us has meant the opposite of "aesthetic" rather than raising the specter of 
"intrinsic utilitarian function," and the question of whether a picture hung 
on your bedroom wall is not in fact as functional as wallpaper, in that it 
serves the same purpose of covering up the blank bits, a conundrum which 
has bothered some European lawyers. The same questions will apply, only 
probably more so, to "works of artistic craftsmanship." We probably would 
not have hesitated, up to now, in treating a handmade piece of costume jew-
elry, like a watch bracelet, as such a work and giving it fifteen years copy-
right, even though it was actually intended as the prototype for hundreds or 
thousands of copies to be sold as part of the Christmas trade, and had the 
utilitarian function of holding the watch in place. But could its designer 
now say, hand on heart, that it was a model "for" an artistic work rather than 
"for" a piece of costume jewelry? Or put the other way, would a court 
accustomed for years now to giving copyright protection to pulley wheels 
and bedpans happily agree that an attractive piece of costume jewelry, 
67. Copying a two-dimensional work in three-dimensional form. which continues to be an 
infringing act in relation to "genuine" artistic works. 
68. See WHAM-O Mfg. Co. v. Lincoln Indus .• 1985 R.P.C. 127. 
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designed with every regard to appearance, was just a "basic commodity 
item" like Madame Merlet's baby's waterproof cape?69 
G. Transitional Provisions 
A design right only applies where the design is recorded in a design 
document, or a prototype is made, after the new Act came into effect. 70 All 
then existing articles made from artistic works will continue to enjoy copy-
right protection for ten years after commencement, but during the second 
half of that period the identical license-of-right provisions that apply to 
design right will apply to that copyright.71 Moreover, the new state of 
affairs is not to affect "the operation of any rule of law preventing or 
restricting the enforcement of copyright in relation to a design," and this is 
apparently intended to preserve the British Leyland defense in relation to 
spare parts. 
"Aesthetic" (registrable) designs, which have the shortened fifteen-year 
term of copyright under section IO of the 1956 Act as amended, will be able 
to enjoy their declining years in peace but will not benefit from the extension 
of similar such rights to twenty-five years under the 1988 Act. 
V. REGISTERED DESIGNS UNDER THE NEW ACT 
A. Changes 
The 1988 Act makes certain important changes to the Registered 
Designs Act of 1949, in particular to the definition in section I. A design 
no longer has to be judged "solely" by the eye, and it need only be "new," not 
"original" as well. More importantly, there is now a "must-match" restric-
tion like that applying to unregistered design rights. Furthermore, there is 
another intriguing exclusion in section I (3) under which no design can be 
registered for an article "if the appearance of the article is not material, that 
is, if aesthetic considerations are not taken into account to a material extent 
by persons acquiring or using the article, and would not be so taken into 
account if the design were to be applied to that article." This apparently 
means that one first decides whether people care what an article of this gen-
eral nature looks like from an aesthetic point of view (this is to exclude the 
engineer who goes into raptures over a well-designed crankshaft because it 
is so obviously fit for its purpose-he is a notional person who has greatly 
troubled some of Britain's finest legal minds). If one concludes that ordi-
nary people do not care what these articles look like, one then has to envis-
age what they would look like if this design were applied to them and decide 
whether people in that case would take the resulting appearance into 
69. Merlet v. Mothercare PLC. 1986 R.P.C. 115. 
70. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 213(7). 
71. There is automatic licensing during the second five years and licensing in cases of abuse 
during the first five years. 
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account. If so, the design is registrable. How this is to work in practice is 
anyone's guess, but the government spokesman said that it is only meant to 
exclude things like internal structural girders, ordinary nails, screws, and 
so on. It is intended that the evidence filed by a successful applicant for a 
design of this nature be open to public inspection, so that would-be infring-
ers can see the kind of evidence they will need in order to attack validity. 
The period of protection is extended (although not for existing regis-
tered designs) from fifteen years (three five-year periods) to twenty-five 
years (five five-year periods).72 This is quite surprising, because it throws 
the United Kingdom out of line with most other countries which operate a 
system of registered designs. It also makes this monopoly right last longer 
than a patent. The definition of infringement under section 7 has also been 
amended and is extended to cover making or dealing with a kit of parts for 
an article as well as the article itself. Although (except as mentioned below) 
there is no automatic licenses-of-right provision for registered designs, there 
will be a power for the minister to make a registered design subject to 
Iicenses-of-right where the Monopolies and Mergers Commission finds that 
there has been anticompetitive abuse. 
B. Transitional Provisions 
Where a design applied for between January 12, 1988, and August 1, 
]989, would not be registrable under the 1988 Act (because it would fall 
within the new "must-match" exclusion or is for an article whose appear-
ance is not "material"), it expires ten years after the 1988 Act came into 
effect, and during the whole of that ten years (not just the last five) it is sub-
ject to licenses-of-right. The date of January 12, 1988, is significant 
because that was when the new restrictions were first proposed in the House 
of Lords, thereby giving covetous would-be design proprietors the chance to 
apply quickly for registrations which the government had already decided 
would not be available in the future. They will still get registrations, but 
these will be severely limited. 
VI. COPYRIGHT IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS UNDER THE NEW 
ACT 
The government's intention in the 1988 Act, as stated in Parliament, 
was to exclude copyright altogether from the field of industrial designs with 
one exception for surface decoration. It was to be design right, with or with-
out design registration, or nothing. The pathetic pleas from interest group 
representatives in Parliament that it would do no harm to allow a shortened 
term of copyright to coexist with design registration, as under the then exist-
ing section 10, were cruelly rejected. So does the 1988 Act purport to make 
copyright noncumulative, not only with design right but also with registered 
72. Copyright. Designs and Patents Act. 1988. ch. 48. § 8. sched. 4. 
390 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
(or registrable) designs, unless the design is "for" an artistic work? Many 
commentators do not seem to think it does, but I am not so sure. Section 
51, it will be recalled, provides that it is not an infringement of copyright in 
a design document or model embodying a design for anything other than an 
artistic work to make or copy the "article" depicted. So unless the "article" 
is itself an artistic work (graphic work, sculpture, collage, work of architec-
ture, or of artistic craftsmanship), copyright cannot be invoked to prevent 
reproduction in three dimensions. Registered, like unregistered, designs 
apply to "articles, .. 73 which may of course be artistic works, as artistic 
works may be articles under section 51. But design registration is not now 
and will not under the 1988 Act be obtainable for articles "primarily of a lit-
erary or artistic character" or for wall plaques, medals, medallions, or 
works of sculpture other than casts or models used or intended to be used as 
models or patterns to be multiplied by an industrial process. 74 If section 51 
has the effect contended for, it may well have succeeded in separating copy-
right not only from design right but from registered and registrable designs 
as well. Only for two-dimensional pattern designs would the rights con-
tinue to coexist, and possibly costume jewelry and the like, as discussed 
above. 
What is to happen where a design document or model records or 
embodies a design for what is accepted to be an artistic work, but the artistic 
work is in fact industrially exploited (by more than fifty copies being made, 
at least one of which is marketed)?75 What about a bust of a leading politi-
cian which, perhaps following a change of government, the artist decides to 
market in sets of ten for use instead of ducks in a shooting gallery? What 
about a painting of a sunset over the capitol, which the artist, falling on hard 
times, decides to exploit by licensing its use on tin trays? The government's 
answer to these questions is section 52 which, like the old section 10 as 
amended, provides that where an artistic work is industrially exploited by 
or with the copyright owner's consent, copyright in all kinds of industrial 
exploitation of the work (the politician as paperweight as well as duck, the 
capitol on T-shirts as well as trays) will expire twenty-five years from first 
marketing, although copyright in the work in its original form will continue 
for the rest of the normal copyright period. 
This is all very nice and apparently much like the old section 10. But 
the whole tenor of the Notes on Clauses and the debates was by reference to 
works intended at the outset to be purely artistic, having no "intrinsic utili-
tarian function." The Notes on Clauses point out that "the application of 
copyright to the making of articles to a design is already limited by clause 
51 (now section 51) which provides that copyright cannot be infringed by 
73. Registered Designs Act. 1949. 12, 13&24Geo.5,ch.46,§§ 1,7,44. 
74. Jd. § 1(5); Registered Designs Rules, S.I. 1989, No. 1105, Rule 26. 
75. This will probably be the test adopted under the 1988 Act. It is the current one, contained 
in the Copyright (Industrial Designs) Rules, S.I. 1957. No. 867. 
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the making of certain articles or the copying of such articles"; and they say 
that clause 52 (now section 52) is subject to that provision. This would sug-
gest that section 52 would apply only to those articles which are themselves 
artistic works. At first glance, however, the 1988 Act itself does not do 
this. Section 52 merely talks about "an artistic work" being industrially 
exploited, and "artistic work" is defined only in section 4 which covers 
graphic works and sculptures irrespective of artistic quality, without overt 
reference to the severe limitations imposed by section 51. Section 52 would 
therefore appear to allow twenty-five years of copyright protection to any 
such work industrially exploited, whether aesthetic or functional. Section 
52(1)(a) refers to an artistic work exploited "by making by an industrial 
process articles failing to be treated for the purposes of this Part [of the 1988 
Act] as copies of the work"; and "this Part" includes section 17 which spells 
out the continuing two-dimensional/three-dimensional reproduction 
definition. Nevertheless, "this Part" includes section 51, so its limitations 
may be said to be inherent in section 52. These two crucial sections are 
likely to be the focal point of litigation until their meaning and interaction is 
clarified. 
This question is also important in the light of prospective United King-
dom obligations, under the Paris text of the Berne Convention, for the pro-
tection of works of applied art by copyright insofar as they are not covered 
by special design protection. 76 For this reason, it may perhaps be assumed 
that section 52 will protect "aesthetic" designs as well as purely artistic 
works, as section to did. Certainly the extension of the term to twenty-five 
years as required by Berne article 7(4), for works of applied art protected by 
copyright, suggests that this will be the case, since the United Kingdom has 
now adhered to the Paris text of the Berne Convention. But in the light of 
the government's own explanation of section 52 as being limited by section 
51, perhaps we are to suppose that section 51 is not after all meant to be as 
restrictive as the Notes on Clauses would suggest. 
To the extent to which copyright still operates in the mass market, it is 
important to note that the Act has abolished "conversion" damages even for 
"continuing" copyrights, except in relation to legal proceedings begun 
before it came into effect. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
That is the new United Kingdom system for industrial design protec-
tion. Much of it may seem rather less strange to American lawyers and 
industrialists than it does to us and to Europeans. I have not presumed to 
comment on the United States Bill S. 791, but it does appear as if our civil 
servants had a look at it. They also had the precedent of our own Semicon-
76. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Sept. 9. 1886. as last 
revised at Paris. July 24. 1971. arts. 2(1),2(7).7(4).828 UN.T.S. 221. reprinted in 3 COpy-
RIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OFTHE WORLD (UNESCO 1984). 
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ductor Products (Protection of Topography) Regulations in 1987, made pur-
suant to EEC Council Directive 87/54/EEC, which I believe is the measure 
which inspired then-President Reagan to proclaim EEC countries entitled to 
protection under the United States 1984 Act. This regulation 77 provides an 
example of a specially-tailored hybrid right of relatively short duration, con-
taining several provisions which reappear in the 1988 Act. 
How our new system will go over in Europe, I should not like to proph-
esy. From being rivalled only by France (sporadically) in the generosity of 
our protection for industrial design, we have apparently moved much closer 
to the miser's end of the spectrum, inhabited by Germany and Italy. To 
make things more confused, the European Commission and Court, which 
have for some years been able to be relied upon to treat intellectual property 
rights with suspicion and to be "defendant's men," seem to be kicking up 
their heels and wantonly enforcing such rights-and now even murmuring 
about copyright as a fairly good way of protecting industrial designs. Never 
trust a bureaucrat or a judge. 
77. Now repJaced byS.I. 1989, No. 1100. 
